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ARTICLES

PUBLIC PENSION LIABILITY: WHY REFORM IS
NECESSARY TO SAVE THE RETIREMENT OF
STATE EMPLOYEES
KAREN EILERS LAIHEY*

& T.

LEIGH ANENSON**

INTRODUCTION

Will public workers today receive their retirement benefits
tomorrow? For state employees, the 2005 Wilshire Report indicates the answer is "no."1 The report is the result of the most
comprehensive study of state retirement system liability. An analysis of 125 state pension systems reveals that the financial future
of important community service providers-like teachers,
firefighters, and the police-are in jeopardy.2 More than half of
those systems reported data for 2004.' Eighty-four percent of
them are underfunded, with the market value of assets less than
the pension liabilities.4 Collective liabilities in these systems
exceed assets in the amount of $163.4 billion.5
*
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1.
See generallyJuLiA K. BONAFEDE ET AL., WILSHIRE Assocs. INC., 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM: FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION
2005, http://www.wilshire.com/Company/2005_StateRetirement_

FundingReport.pdf [hereinafter 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT].
2. Id. at 1; see also id. at app. A (listing retirement systems included in the
study). There are 2,670 public retirement systems for state and local employees
in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, EMPLOYEERETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 2002, at 14 (2004).
3. 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (noting 64 of 125 systems).
109 state systems provided data for 2003. Id.
4. Id. at 4 (reporting fifty-four of sixty-four systems are underfunded).
102 of the 109 systems reporting data for 2003, or 94%, are also underfunded,
with collective liabilities exceeding assets in the amount of $375.6 billion. Id. at
3-7.
5. Id. at 3.
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A market downturn and an aging population explain the
monumental deficit and dangerous financial insecurity of state
pension systems.6 Most of these systems sponsor defined benefit
plans. 7 Unlike defined contribution plans, in which employees
manage and bear the risk of their own retirement savings, 8
defined benefit plans obligate employers to provide employees
retirement income regardless of market performance.9 Since
2000, the funding ratio of defined benefit plans has declined.' °
Even more alarming, the number of such pension plans that are
underfunded has more than doubled.1 This means that, nationwide, state and local pension plans do not have sufficient assets
to cover projected liabilities. The net effect of these phenomena
is that government 12workers may never receive their expected
retirement income.
This article addresses the pernicious problem of public pensions and suggests some solutions for funding the future. Part I
provides an overview of pension plans. It explains what they are
and how they work. Part II details the data in the Wilshire
Report and its troubling implications. This part also highlights
6. Local public pensions appear to share the same fate. The 2003 Wilshire Report on City and County Retirement Systems showed the aggregate
funding ratio for city and county retirement systems to be 88%, with liabilities
exceeding assets in the amount of $35.3 billion. SeeJULIA L BONAFEDE ET AL.,
WILSHIRE Assocs. INC., 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS:
FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION 1 (2004), http://www.wilshire.com/
Company/2004 StateRetirementFundingReport.pdf [hereinafter 2004 WiL,
SHIRE REPORT] (citing WILSHIRE ASsoCs. INC., 2003 WILSHIRE REPORT ON CITY &
COUNTY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION (2003)).
7. See 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supranote 1, at 4. The report includes only
state-sponsored defined benefit retirement systems. Id. at 3.
8. See, e.g., ALICLA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDtN, COMING UP SHORT: THE
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 2 (2004); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
9. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined ContributionParadigm,114 YALE
L.J. 451, 457 (2004); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
10. See 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5 (relating funding
ratios based on actuarial value of assets). Market value funding ratios dropped
dramatically between 2000 and 2002 and remained relatively flat over the next
two years. Id. at 5.
11. See id. at 4. Underfunded plans based on actuarial value also
increased from 53% in 2000 to 77% in 2004. IL
12. While state governments are arguably a good credit risk and may find
ways to finance the retirement of their workers from other public resources,
taxpayers ultimately suffer the repercussions of poorly performing public pension funds. The Other Pension Crisis,WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2006, at A14 ("Public
pensions only have one source of money - the taxpayer."). In the interim, low
funding levels negatively impact tax rates, property values, investment ratings
on government bonds, and salary negotiations with public employees. Stephen
P. D'Arcy et al., Optimal Fundingof State Employee Pension System, 66J. RISK & INS.
345, 345 (1999).
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and compares the financial dilemmas facing particular states in
all regions of the country.1 3 The public pension situations in California and Illinois, in particular, are explored. California is significant because it has the largest pension system measured in
assets. Illinois is noteworthy for another reason-its system has
one of the largest liabilities and, accordingly, is confronting the
most difficult financial recovery.
Part III proposes changes to the pension paradigm. It draws
on the experiences of the federal government, states like Florida,
and the major shift that has occurred in the private sector. Given
the ongoing instability of the economy, this part cautions against
the continued use of bonds to fix the failing financial status of
public pensions. Moreover, instead of offering only defined benefit plans, Part III supports the movement to optional or exclusive defined contribution plans, coupled with an employee
education program describing the distinction. It further urges
the universal acceptance of mandatory disclosure laws: The lack
of information on the government-pensions crisis is perhaps the
reason the public has not paid attention to the disastrous condition of their state retirement systems. This article concludes that
the degree of financial distress evidenced in the recent Wilshire
Report confirms that the issue can no longer be ignored. It aims
to end the silence and begin the debate about public retirement
plans.
I.

OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC PENSION PLANS

Public pension plans vary by state in terms of their formulas
for retirement benefits and eligibility. State governments may
also offer separate pension systems within the state for different
kinds of employees. Thus, the police pension fund may differ
from the teachers' fund, which may differ from the funds of
other public workers.1 4
13. The article discusses the status of retirement systems in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, Mississippi,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West
Virginia.
14. See Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Developments in State and Local Pension
Plans, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 11, 15 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C.
Hustead eds., 2001). Plans are different because they cover employees with dif-

ferent characteristics. For the police and firefighters whose jobs are physically
demanding, retirement plans provide for retirement at earlier ages in order to
preserve a younger workforce. Id. Social security will also affect retirement
benefits. Those systems whose participants do not pay social security will have

higher retirement benefits to make up for not receiving social security benefits.
Id. Teachers typically accrue benefits after thirty years of service and receive
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The defined benefit plan remains the primary pension plan
offered in these systems.15 An alternative retirement plan
increasing in popularity is the defined contribution plan. Both
kinds of pension plans are explained below.
A.

Defined Benefit Plan

Defined benefit plans place the onus on the government to
provide retirement income to its employees based on a formula
involving the employee's service and salary histories. t6 While
plans differ in details, the general formula, at retirement, entitles
an employee to an annual income equal to a percentage of the
employee's final average salary, multiplied by the number of
years of employment.17
A defined benefit plan provides for employer, and sometimes employee, contributions to a trust fund administered by a
trustee.18 In the public sector, the trust fund manager is generally a politically appointed or member-elected retirement board
that makes investment decisions and determines funding levels
57.7% of the final average salary, while public safety workers generally receive
66.6% of the final average salary. Id. at 20-21.
15. Id. at 11. Ninety percent of public employee plans are defined benefit plans. Gordon Tiffany, Public Employee Retirement Planning, 28 EMP. BENEFITS
J., June 2003, at 3, 7.
16. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 456-57.
17. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAx REV. 683,
687-91 (2000); see also Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. Local 1752, 29 F.3d 83, 84 (2d
Cir. 1994) (providing details of a private defined benefit plan). The final-pay
provision bases benefits on earnings averaged, for example, over the last three
years of employment or over the three consecutive years in a ten-year period
immediately prior to retirement in which earnings are the highest. Compare
California's relatively simple state retirement system formula-2% x Years of
Service x Final Average Salary-with Ohio's more complicated formula-2.2%
x Final Average Salary x Years of Service up to thirty years and 2.5% x Final
Average Salary x Years of Service after thirty years. NATIONAL EDUCATION AssoCIATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE PUBLIC EDUCATION PENSION PLANS 60, 63
(2004),
available at http://www.nea.org/takenote/images/char2004.pdf.
Another common method is the career-pay provision that bases benefits on
earnings averaged over the entire career of employment. For an explanation of
the various types of defined benefit formulas used in calculating plan benefits,
see EVERErr T. ALLEN ET AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 229-34 (9th ed. 2003), as well as COMM.
ON RETIREMENT SYSTEM RESEARCH, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, SURVEY OF ASSET VALU-

ATION METHODS FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS (2001), availableat http://
www.soa.org/ccm/content/?categorylD=1079102
(surveying asset valuation
methods used in Canada and the United States for defined benefit plans).
18. SeeALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 441-53. Other funding instruments
to hold and accumulate assets (besides trusts) include custodial accounts or
insurance company contracts. Id.
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and contribution obligations.' 9 Upon retirement, periodic payments ("defined payments") are paid from the fund for the duration of the participant's life and potentially that of his or her
spouse.2 °
Defined benefit plans provide deferred income that is not
taxed until distribution to an employee.21 It is an employer's
duty to fund the plan.2 2 As a result, employers bear the risk of
market fluctuation and must contribute additional funds when
necessary to ensure proper pay-outs. 23 Market decline, an aging
work force with an increasing amount of retirees,24 and insufficient funding result in accrued pension liabilities.
B.

Defined Contribution Plan

Defined contribution plans are the predominant pension
plan offered by private employers.25 Some state systems also
19. See Edwin C. Hustead & Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Sector Pension Plans:
Lessons and Challenges for the Twenty-First Century, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 14, at 5, 8; Jun Peng, Public Pension Funds and OperatingBudgets:
A Tale of Three States, 24 PuB. BUDGETING & FIN. 59, 64 (2004). Board of trustee
composition at state and local pension systems falls into three categories
depending on how they were selected: plan member-elected, politically
appointed by the governor or legislative committee, or ex officio trustees who
serve because they hold a particular public office such as the state treasurer or
controller. David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets:
EmpiricalEvidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices,39 U.C. DAvis
L. RFv. 187, 195 (2005); see also Michael Useem & David Hess, Governance and
Investments of PublicPensions, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 14,
at 132 (noting that state retirement systems differ in the use of external or inhouse money managers, board oversight of investment strategy, and investment
performance of public plan assets).
20. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 454.
21. See, e.g., Lee G. Knight et al., An Application of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process to Tax Policy Decisions: The Termination of Overfunded PensionPlans, 12 AM.
J. TAx POL'v 101, 106 (1995) (discussing tax provisions of defined benefit
plans).
22. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 457.
23. Id.
24. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined
Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, 1999 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 187, 193-94
(1999) (discussing pension liabilities).
25. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 470; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at
52-54 (listing various kinds of defined contribution arrangements, such as the
401 (k) plan). The percentage of employees participating in defined contribution plans is roughly double that of defined benefit plans. Zelinsky, supra note
9, at 470. The assets held by employer-sponsored defined contribution plans
also exceed the assets of defined benefit arrangements by $2.1 trillion. Id. at
470-71. For an analysis of the workplace and market trends that have contributed to the popularity of defined contribution plans, see ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 17, at 424-25.
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sponsor this form of retirement plan.2 6
In contrast to defined benefits plans, which provide an output to the employee, defined contribution plans specify an
input.27 An employer's only obligation is to make the "contribution" to the employee account. 28 In some cases, these plans are
largely self-funded by an employee's salary-reduction-contributions to his or her own account. 29 In other cases, defined contribution plans are designed to permit an employer to decide
annually how much, if anything, it will contribute to an
employee's account.3 ° Hence, defined contribution plans are
always fully funded.
Rather than a trustee or board managing an employerowned trust fund, employees make the investment decisions and
otherwise manage their own retirement accounts.3" While
employees (and not employers) bear the risk of market fluctuation, defined contribution plans are advantageous for workers
who change jobs." In fact, after studying the pension choices of
faculty at a state public university over a twenty-three year period,
26. See Hess, supranote 19, at 189 n.9; see also Staff, Profiles of the Top Public
Defined Contribution Plans,PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 31, 2003, at 16-18; see
also discussion infra Part III.A.
27. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 455.
28. MUNNELL & SUNDPN, supra note 8, at 2; Forman, supra note 24, at
193-94. However, an employer should structure an appropriate investment
program, select suitable investment managers, monitor investment performance, and communicate critical investment provisions to employees. See ALLEN
ET AL., supra note 17, at 436.
29. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 454.
30. Id. at 455 (noting that defined benefit plans are a fixed cost unrelated
to profitability).
31. Employers are better able to absorb the risks of investment performance due to economies of scale resulting in lower transaction costs and the
ability to average out investment results among a number of retirees. See Daniel
Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income-the Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality,
11 ELDER L.J. 37, 61 (2003). There is also some evidence to suggest that
employers are better at managing investment accounts than their employees.
See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization,46
ARIz. L. REv. 53, 83 (2004). In public pension systems, however, empirical studies suggest otherwise. See PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM: A REVIEW (2001), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/media/843F0/31.pdf. In fact, the most recent study of state and local pension systems in the United States proposes not only to minimize the political
pressures on the governing boards of trustees of public pensions by changing
their composition, but also, to improve their training. See Hess, supra note 19,
at 216-20. For advice on investment objectives and guidelines for investment
managers or boards, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 402-05.
32. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 441-53; MUNNELL & SUNDtN,
supra note 8, at 2; see also PATRICKJ. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIRARY OF
CONG.,

PENSION

ISSUES:

LUMP-SUM

DISTRIBUTIONS

AND
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Robert Clark and Melinda Pitts concluded that younger professors chose the defined contribution plan over the defined benefit plan to avoid mobility risk.3 3 The accumulated account can be
transferred to their new employer, and employees do not suffer a
decrease in potential retirement benefits because such benefit
distribution does not depend on length of service. 3 4 While most
contribution plans distribute retirement benefits in a lump sum,
employees can choose to annuitize payments to eliminate the
risk that they will outlive their retirement resources.3 5 It is even
better for employees if the plan provides for the annuitization of
distributions, so that the government is responsible for purchasing annuity contracts at a lower overall cost than public participants individually.3 6 Defined contribution plans offer the same
tax-deferred income as defined benefit plans. 7
II.

DEFINING THE PENSION PROBLEM

The problem of public pension liability stems solely from
the government-sponsored defined benefit plan where the investment risk is born by the state. It bears repeating that most state
pension systems use the defined benefit plan. As discussed
above, these plans require employees to rely on employers for
their retirement income. 8 In theory, the promise of a pension
(2003) (noting that a typical twenty-five-year-old today will work for
seven or more employers before reaching retirement age).
33. Robert L. Clark & M. Melinda Pitts, Faculty Choice of a Pension Plan:
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution, 38 INDUs. REL. 18, 44 (1999). The
study was conducted of the faculty at North Carolina State University between
1971 and 1994. See id.
34. MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 8, at 2-3. Defined benefit plans can
also be designed to provide distribution in one lump sum, but most do not. See
Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 473-74. For a discussion of employer flexibility in
plan design, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 25-43.
35. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Mortality Risk, Inflation Risk, and Annuity Products, in INNOVATIONS IN RETIREMENT FINANCING (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds.,
2002); Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 463.
36. See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four "Truths" of Personal Social
Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(k) Plans, 81 N.C. L. REv. 901, 959
(2003) ("Annuity providers will price the traditional annuity at a higher cost to
account for this systematic increased risk of longevity among purchasers of
traditional annuities."); see also Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 463-64 (noting that
the option is rarely used).
37. Under either the defined benefit or the contribution plan, the deferral of income taxation until retirement benefits the retiree by providing a
higher after-tax return on investment earnings and a lower tax bracket on distribution due to the fact that the retiree is no longer working. See, e.g.,
Daniel I.
Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 95 YALE L.J. 506
(1986).
38. See discussion supra Part I.A.
SECURITY
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benefit, under a defined benefit plan, creates a concomitant duty
on the part of the state. 39 In reality, however, the danger that
state governments will fail to contribute the funds necessary to
finance adequate retirement benefits-the "funding risk"-falls
on the employee. 4 °
Unlike defined benefit plans offered by private companies,
state government plans lack both oversight by the federal government and an insurance program to provide benefits if the plan
fails. 4 ' The financial status of these public pensions is also difficult to discern. When and how liabilities are reported is subject
43
42
Not all states publish current data.
to vagaries in each state.

Moreover, comparisons of the reported information among public pension systems are complicated by the different levels of requisite funding and underlying assumptions that determine
pension plan liabilities.4 4 These assumptions include
demographics, assumed rates of return on investments, as well as
other economic indicators and information about the plan.4 5
States may also consolidate their systems for purposes of reporting or disclose the data separately for each system within the
state. Given the serious funding problems of public pensions, a
recent study by Tongxuan Yang and Olivia Mitchell highlighted
the lack of national regulation and conformity about funding
targets, management of funds, investment alternative, and
reporting of performance.4 6
39.

See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENWELFARE BENEFITS 34-35 (2004); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
40. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 401-02; see also Zelinsky, supra note
9, at 458-65 (comparing defined benefit and contribution arrangements based
on the risks of investment, funding, and longevity (i.e., that a participant will
outlive his or her retirement resources)). For evidence that states are omitting
or reducing contributions to their pension funds, see John E. Petersen, In an
Era of Uncertainty, States and Localities are Looking to Some Unusual Options, GovERNING, June 2004, at 54, 55-56, as well as Janice Revell, The $366 Billion OutSION AND

rage, FORTUNE, May 31, 2004, at 130.
41.

See, e.g., Useem & Hess, supra note 19, at 132.
See 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
43. See generally 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1; see also id. at 3 (noting that even for those systems seeking to report in a timely manner, it often
takes six months to a year for actuaries to determine values).
44. See id.; see also Mitchell et al., supra note 14, at 23-25 (discussing various methods used by actuaries to determine pension plan liabilities).

42.

45.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

supra note

17, at 70-71.

For

instance, in retirement systems for teachers, different actuarial methods for calculating retirement benefits include age at entry, projected unit credit, and
aggregate cost. See id. at 70-77. Assumed inflation rates ranged from 2.5% to
5% and assumed interest rates ranged from 7% to 12.9%. See id.
46. Tongxuan Yang & Olivia S. Mitchell, Pension Research Council, Public Pension Governance, Funding, and Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal
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Despite these differences, the predominant calculation used
to evaluate defined benefit plans is the funding ratio.4 7 This
ratio measures a plan's financial health by dividing the market or
actuarial value of assets by the liabilities.4 8 If liabilities exceed
assets, the plan is underfunded.4"
A.

2005 Wilshire Report Results

In 2005, Wilshire Associates Inc. published a report of 125
public pension systems sponsored by the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 50 The report is the tenth of its kind to study
state retirement system liability.5 1 It concluded that an overwhelming majority of pension plans are underfunded. 2 Not
only do they lack sufficient assets to cover anticipated liabilities,
but their collective deficit measures in the hundreds of billions of
dollars.53
The lack of assets is attributed to the decline in the stock
market beginning in 2000. Since that time, overall asset values in
public pensions have fallen to $1.7 trillion while liabilities have
grown to $2.1 trillion.5 4 The number of underfunded plans has
also risen.55 In fact, from 2000 to 2003, the percentage of
underfunded plans almost tripled. 6 While the percentage of

(2005),

http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org/publications/papers.php?

year=2005.
47. See 2005 WILSHIRE

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 3; Mitchell et al., supra

note 14, at 25.

48. See 2005 WILSHIRE

REPORT, supra note

1, at 3. The actuarial value of

assets is often determined using a smoothing method to reduce the effects of
market volatility when calculating contribution rates. See id. at 9. For an explanation of the different valuation methods (current market, actuarial, or variations of the two), see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 253-54.

49. See 2005
50. Id.
51. Id.
52.

WILSHIRE REPORT,

supra note 1, at 3.

See id. at 1; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
54. See 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
55. See 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
56. Id. (showing the increase in underfunded plans in terms of market
value of assets).

53.
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underfunded plans decreased in 2004, 57 the overall5 8funding ratio
of these plans declined as it had the year before.
Without significant reforms, the downward trend can be
expected to continue. The growing number of retirees alone will
strain the system. Growth among employees who are at the age
of retirement is growing almost four times faster than the total
population.5 9 In more than half the states, the population of
persons sixty-five years and older will double by 2030.6" Thus, in
less than twenty-five years, the number of persons in this age category will double in size and represent about 20% of the total population, compared to only about 12% today.6 1 In fact, almost
one in five Americans-some
seventy-two million people-will be
62
sixty-five years or older.
B.

State-by-State Summary

Funding ratios and levels vary within and between states.
The most recent comparative data available by state is provided
in the 2004 Wilshire Report.6" It reported that only two states
had pension assets that exceeded liabilities.64 It also ranked
57. Id. (reporting that underfunded plans based on market value of assets
declined from 97% to 84%). The number of underfunded plans based on market value of assets doubled from 2000 to 2004. Id. The number of
underfunded plans based on actuarial value of assets remained steady at 77%
between 2003 and 2004. Id.
58. The funding ratio based on actuarial value of assets declined from
87% in 2003 to 85% in 2004. See id. The funding ratio based on market value
of assets increased from 77% in 2003 to 83% in 2004. Id.
59. See PRoJEcTIONS BRANCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE INTERIM POPULATION PROJECTIONS BY AGE AND SEX: 2004-2030 tbl. 4 (2005), available at http://
www.census.gov/population/projections/PressTab4.xls (projecting the change
in the total population of the United States between 2000 and 2030 at 29.2%
and the change in the population of those sixty-five years and older at 104.2%).
60. See id. at tbl. 5 (providing the number of elderly persons sixty-five
years and older for 2000 and making projections for 2010 and 2030).
61. Id.; see also Press Release, Nat'l Inst. on Aging, Nat'l Inst. of Health,
Dramatic Changes in U.S. Aging Highlighted in New Census, NIH Report (Mar.
9, 2006) (highlighting data from report commissioned by the National Institute
on Aging: WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005
(2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/
archives/aging__population/006544.html). For trends in labor force participation and the age at which employees are choosing to retire, see Joseph F.
Quinn, New Paths to Retirement, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 2000).
62. See Press Release, supra note 61.
63. 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6.
64. Id. at 2.
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retirement systems, and their states overall, by funding ratio.65
Market asset to liability funding ratios between states varied from
as high as 116% in North Carolina to as low as 40% in West Virginia.6 6 Like North Carolina, New Jersey and Georgia also
appear to have good aggregate funding ratios, at 97% and 98%
respectively. 67 Nevertheless, the allegedly positive financial
health of their retirement systems is suspect, given that the most
recent data reported from these states is from 2001.68
Independent assessment of the latest reported state data
shows that funding levels in the four plans sponsored by South
Carolina had ratios that ranged from 63.7% for judges and solicitors to 91.5% for police officers.6 9 In Kansas, the highest funding ratio for one of its plans was 85% and the lowest was 63%.7 o
Kansas's overall funded ratio for all state retirement systems
declined 5% between 2003 and 2004, from 75% to 70%. 7 ' The
State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio fared a bit better with
a funded ratio of 74.8%, as of fiscal year ending June 30, 2004,
but dropped to 72.8% for 2005.72 The situation for teachers in
Illinois, however, is bleak, with funded ratios of 49.3% in 2003,
ratios of 61.9% in 2004, and ratios of 60.8% in 2005. 73
65.
Wilshire
66.
67.

68.
69.

Id. at apps. B, C (showing market value of assets). The latest 2005
Report did not contain this information.
Id. at app. C (indicating ratio of assets at market value to liabilities).
Id.

Id. at 6.
S.C. RETIREMENT

SYSTEM, S.C. STATE BUDGET & CONTROL BOARD, PopULAR ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://www.retirement.sc.
gov/publications/pafr2004.pdf (reporting pension trust funds of South Carolina for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2004).
70. KAN. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, LONG-TERM RETIREMENT
FUNDING UPDATE (July 20, 2005), (on file with authors) (listing the state group
with the highest funding level and the school group with the lowest). The
report cites 2001 and 2002 investment losses as one of the reasons for the

decline. Id.
71. Id.; see also KAN. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 19 (2005), available at http://www.kpers.org/
annualreport2005.pdf (reporting on fiscal year ended June 30, 2005 and listing
funded ratios for 2005 at 69.8% and for 2004 at 75.2%).
72. STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF OHIO, COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 15 (2005), available at http://www.strsoh.org/pdfs/
cafr2005/05-financial.pdf; see also STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF OHIO,
A REPORT TO THE OHIO RETIREMENT STUDY COUNCIL 2 (2006), availableat www.
orsc.org/uploadpdf/STRS%2030%20plan.pdf. For a collection of articles on
issues regarding the academic labor market in the twenty-first century, see To
RETIRE OR NOT? RETIREMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Robert L. Clark & P. Brett Hammond eds., 2001).
73. Ill. Teachers' Retirement System, General Information Administra(last visited
tion, http://www.trs.state.il.us/subsections/general/admin.htm
Feb. 8, 2007) (2003 statistics were available on the same website as of May

318

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

By comparison, Arizona's state retirement system had a
funded status of 97% in 2003.71 In 2004, the funding level dipped to 91%. 7 1 While Arizona public employees should feel safer

in their promised benefits than employees in other states, the
funded ratio of all Arizona systems was consolidated for reporting purposes. Aggregate statistics can mask the fiscal weakness of
individual plans because assets in well-funded plans are not transferable to underfunded plans. 76 Therefore, the financial health
of a single system may be less certain.
Comparing the unfunded liabilities to the state budget puts
the financial distress of the majority of state retirement systems
into greater perspective. 77 Dividing unfunded liabilities by the
annual state budget shows what, if any, funds are available to
cover unfunded liabilities. An amount greater than 100% means
that unfunded liabilities exceed the budget. Nevada, for example, has unfunded liabilities in its retirement systems that are
2.69 times its annual budget, or 269%.78 In 2003, all but two
states had pension liabilities that exceeded their state budgets.7 9
C.

Illinois Pension Plan

The Illinois Retirement System provides benefits to approximately 647,000 members in five retirement systems.8 ° Each of
2005); see also 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (Exhibit 5). The worst
state retirement system for teachers in 2003 was West Virginia with a 19% funding ratio. See id. Indiana (42%) and Oklahoma (49%) were also at the bottom
in terms of funding. Id.

74.

ARiz.

STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL

REPORT 104 (2004),
available at http://www.asrs.state.az.us/web/pdf/
financials/200501115 1stAnnualComprehensiveFinancialReport.pdf
(reporting for the year ended June 30, 2004).
75. ARIZ. STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REP. 103 (2005), available at http://www.asrs.state.az.us/web/pdf/financials/
2005_AnnualComprehensiveFinancialReport.pdf (reporting for the year
endedJune 30, 2005).
76. 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
77. 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
78. Id. Mississippi (210%), Oklahoma (206%), Illinois (197%), and Colorado (196%) round out the bottom five. Id.
79. Id. at 7-9; see also id. at app. E. Another metric to measure the financial health of retirement systems is found by comparing the size of the
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) relative to covered payroll. Statistics from 2000 to 2005 show that the UAAL increased as a percentage of payroll,
indicating the deteriorating financial condition of most state systems. See 2005
WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8 (Exhibit 7).
80.

THE GOVERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, PENSION REFORM REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2005), available at http://www.state.il.us/budget/Pension%20Commission%2OFinal%202.11.05.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION] (The Governor's Pension Commission was mandated by
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these plans offers a defined pension benefit that takes into
account compensation levels, years of service, and whether the
employee is covered by Social Security." l
While most state retirement systems are in serious financial
trouble, the funding problem in Illinois is the worst. Illinois's
unfunded pension liabilities are greater than those of any other
state.8 2 In 2004, its retirement systems collectively posted liabilities of $90 billion." All Illinois pension systems had a 60.9%
funded ratio.8 4 Combined, these retirement funds had $54.7 billion in assets, $89.8 billion in liabilities, with a resulting $35.1
billion in unfunded liabilities.8 5 The retirement systems in Illinois rank in the bottom ten plans, as compared against the hundreds of other state plans.8 6
Illinois's unfunded pension debt is greater than all of its
bonded debt combined. 7 Illinois's unfunded liabilities are also
1.97 times its annual budget, a ratio of 197%.8' The underfunding problem was caused from annual state contributions of less
than the necessary actuarial amount, increased pension benefits,
investment losses, and a downturn in the economy.8 9 For
instance, from 1995 through 2003, Illinois failed to make adeIllinois State Governor Rod Blagojevich.). These plans include the Downstate
Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), State Universities Retirement System
(SURS), State Employees' Retirement System (SERS), General Assembly Retirement System (GARS), and Judges' Retirement System (RS). See Daniel W.
Hynes, Illinois State Comptroller, Illinois State Pension Needs Put Pressure on the
State Budget, 2006, http://www.ioc.state.il.us/FiscalFocus/current/article.cfm?
ID=138.
81. See Hynes, supra note 80.
82. GovERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 3.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Hynes, supra note 80.
85. Id.
[The Downstate Teachers' Retirement System] holds over half of the
assets and is responsible for over half of the liabilities. At the end of
the fiscal year 2004, TRS had a 61.9% funded ratio with $50.9 billion
in liabilities, $31.5 billion in assets, and $19.4 billion in unfunded liabilities. SURS had a 66.0% funded ratio with $12.6 billion in assets
versus $19.1 billion in liabilities and SERS had a 54.2% funded ratio
with $10.0 billion in assets and $18.4 billion in liabilities.
Id.
86. See 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6, at app. B. The state itself
ranks second to last by funding ratio. See id. at app. C.
87. GovERNoR's PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 4. The mandate
of the Governor's Pension Commission was to review the financial condition of
the State of Illinois's Retirement Systems and make recommendations to
improve the financial condition and affordability of the system. Id. at 2.
88. 2004 WILSHIRE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (Exhibit 8).
89. GovERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 8-9.
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quate contributions to its retirement systems, resulting in a
shortfall of $10.6 billion.9t Not only were pensions underfunded
during a strong economic environment, but in 2002, early retirement incentives were added during a time of economic downturn.9"
The Illinois retirement funds have experienced
investment losses of $6.4 billion since 1995.92 Yet, during the
same time frame, the state also increased pension benefits by
$5.8 9billion
without introducing funding to cover additional
3
costs.

D.

CaliforniaPension Plan

In comparison to Illinois and a host of other states, the California Public Employees' Retirement Systems (CalPERS) is in relatively good financial health. As of June 2004, the funded ratio
was 84.1% for state employees and 92.7% for school employees.9 4
Like Illinois and most other states, CalPERS is a defined benefit retirement system and provides benefits based on a member's years of service, age, and highest compensation. 9 5 It
provides retirement and health benefits to more than 2,500
employers and more than 1.4 million employees, retirees, and
their families.9 6 With defined contribution assets of $168.320 billion, CalPERS was the largest public or private pension fund in
the United States in 2004.9 7
However, even multiple millions of dollars in assets will not
preserve the retirement income of California's public employees
in the future. The cost of retirement benefits rose from $160
million in 2000 to $2.6 billion, in 2005, with a projected $3.5
billion in 2009.98 Confronting the same economic and demographic indicators as other states, Californians are attempting to
90.
91.

Id. at 8.
Id. at9.

92.
93.

Id. at 8.
Id.
94. CAL. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, FACTS AT A GLANCE,
http: //www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Cal. Public Employees' Retirement System, About CalPERS, http://
www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/home.xml (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
97. See The Top 200 Pension Funds/Sponsors,PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan.
24, 2005, at 16-18 (ranking the top two hundred pension funds and sponsors
by total assets).
98. Keith Richman, Editorial, How the State Can Tackle Public Pensions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 10, 2005, at B9.
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reform their retirement system before the situation becomes a
financial disaster, like that in Illinois.99
III.

SOLUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION LIABILITY

A typical response for states attempting to address the funding problem of their retirement systems is to issue bonds that will
fund contributions and provide capital for monthly payments.
For example, the Illinois state retirement system issued a $10 billion pension bond at the beginning of fiscal year 2004.10' This
bond issue reduced the retirement systems' unfunded liabilities
from $43 billion to $34 billion and increased the funding ratio
from 48.6% to 57%.101 California even used a $900 million pen-

its debts due to increased bension obligation bond to help cover
10 2
efits and fiscal mismanagement.
Notably, the use of pension-funding bonds involves a wager
that markets will perform during the life of the bonds. Based on
this assumption, pension-investment-performance offsets interest
and debt service payments. 10 3 With poor market performance,
however, pension-funding bonds will fall short of expected benefits. This was unfortunately the case for the retirement systems in
both New Jersey and Pittsburgh.10 4 Based on these experiences,
Illinois, California, and any other state or local retirement system
should be cautious in issuing bonds as a bandage to cure the
financial woes of its public pension funds. 10 5 Rather than bonds
as a stop-gap measure that gambles on economic upswings or
99. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the proposed constitutional
amendment to change new public employee pensions from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans).
100.

GOVERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 3. The bond

issue provided $2.16 billion in state contributions for years 2003 and 2004. The
balance contributed $7.3 billion toward reducing the five public employee
retirement systems' unfunded liabilities. Id.
101. Id.
102. Richman, supra note 98. Other public pension systems have been
spotlighted recently for poor financial behavior. See Editorial, Pension Fund Shenanigans,WALL ST.J., Aug. 20, 2004, at Al2 (discussing trustee mismanagement
costing state pension systems multiple millions of dollars); The OtherPension Crisis, supra note 12, at A14 (detailing SEC report regarding San Diego's pension
fund scandal).
103. Richman, supra note 98. A bond, in effect, forces the state to make
necessary contributions to plans but burdens it with debt payments for the contributions, which last to the bond's maturity.
104. Id.
105. Underfunding will also adversely affect the investment ratings of
government bonds. See Daniel P. Mahoney, Toward a More EthicalSystem of State
and Local Government Retirement Funding, 14 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN.
MGMT. 197, 202 (2002).
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other unlikely uncertainties, 10 6 states should focus on fool-proof
pension reform."0 7 These measures would account for the
increasing number of retirees and safeguard against a stagnant
or declining economy.
State and local retirement systems should consider two
reforms."' 8 First, public pensions should sponsor defined contribution plans in lieu of, or in addition to, the traditional defined
benefit plans. Second, states should require mandatory public
disclosure of the financial status of their pension funds. The two
reforms are discussed below.
A.

Exclusive or OptionalDefined Contribution Plans

State and local governments should begin sponsoring exclusive or optional defined contribution plans for their new employees. Especially in those states that will allow their employees to
choose between defined benefit and contribution plans, public
pension reform should be accompanied by an education pro-

106. See Richard W. Johnson, Pension Underfunding and Liberal Retirement
Benefits Among State and Local Government Workers, 50 NAT'L TAXJ. 113 (1997)

(discussing that state and local pensions have an incentive to underfund pension systems because residents will leave the community before benefits are
paid).
107.

See, e.g., The Other Pension Crisis, supra note 12, at A14 ("The long-

term solution is for government to follow the private sector and wean public
workers from the defined-benefit pension model to a defined-contribution plan
where an individual worker owns and controls his [or her] own retirement
investments."). Incremental improvements may be made by increasing
employer and employee contributions or by other measures. Arizona, for
instance, increased employer and employee contribution rates in its retirement
system, from 7.4% to 9.1%, due to past benefit increases, lower investment
returns, and the changing demographics. See ARIz. STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
ASRS WEEKLY REPORT (June 16, 2006), available at http://www.azasrs.gov/web/
pdf/weekly-reports/20060616.pdf. In order to address solvency issues without
using taxpayer dollars, the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association
(PERA) employee-members gave up 3% of their cost of living raises over the
next six years, and future PERA members must work an additional five years to
become eligible for retirement. Lynn Bartels, Win-win' Pension Deal: Owens,
Lawmakers Reach Pact, Avoid Tax Rescue of PERA, Rocan MTN. NEws, May 6, 2006,

at 4A (discussing Colorado Senate Bill 235). These and other reforms (including the offering of defined contribution plans) are expected to solve the system's $11.3 billion in underfunding by 2051. Id.
108. Other reforms may be important as well, depending on the situation
of any given retirement system. Recent legal scholarship suggests that
reforming the structure of public pension boards may contribute to the financial security of state systems. See generally Hess, supra note 19.
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gram explaining the distinctions between the plans in order to
encourage participation.' 0 9
As discussed in Part I.B, defined contribution plans do not
accumulate unfunded liabilities. An employer's only obligation
is to make the requisite contribution to the employee's account.
State governments offering a defined contribution plan would
not be at the mercy of market performance or subject to any
other subsequent event. In this way, costs are known in advance
and can be included in the budget.
Employees would no longer be forced to rely on a trustee,
pension board, or other quasi-political body to safeguard their
retirement savings. Rather, these plans allow them to manage
and bear the risk of their own retirement funds. Certainly, some
new older public employees may balk at the idea of a defined
contribution arrangement.1 1 ° With their proximity to retirement, older employees may perceive an advantage in the defined
benefit plans given the appearance of security in the government's promise to fund their pensions along with the longevitylinked pay and benefits.1"1 ' Nevertheless, even public employees
have been exposed to the increasing amount of pension and tax
legislation over the last thirty years that has allowed for the creation of individual accounts for retirement savings, healthcare,
and education." 2 These accounts operate like defined contribution plans, and public familiarity with them has revolutionized
the way people think about retirement.' 1 3 The newly enacted
109. See ALLEN ET AL., supranote 17, at 430 ("Employee communication is
a critical link in the long-term success of defined contribution plans."). The
education of employees was advocated in a series of articles published by the
Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Pennsylvania Press. See B. Douglas Bernheim,
FinancialIlliteracy, Education, and Retirement Saving, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 38, 39 (Olivia S.

Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998); Robert L. Clark & Sylvester J.
Schieber, Factors Affecting Participation Rates and Contribution Levels in 401(k)
Plans, in LIVING WITHi DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT,

supra, at

69, 85.

110. See Clark & Pitts, supra note 33, at 44 (concluding that older new
hires at a public university were more likely to enroll in the defined benefit
plan).
111. See Zelinsky, supra note 17, at 720.
112. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 482-508. Defined contribution plans have
been called "individual account" plans because an employer pays into a separate employee account. See 1 GARv I. BOREN & NoRMAN P.
(2001).

STEIN,

QUALIFIED

DEFER RED COMPENSATION PLANS § 1:6

113. Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 457-58 ("The shift from the defined benefit modality to the defined contribution one has altered in a fundamental manner the way in which Americans experience and think about retirement
savings."); see also Theo Francis, DuPont Aims to Slash Pension Plan, WALL ST. J.,
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Pension Protection Act of 2006 also includes incentives for their
increased use.1 14 Consequently, the assumption of responsibility
(and reward) may prove politically palatable.
Given the increasingly mobile workforce, another benefit to
employees is portability-the ability to take their accounts with
them to a new employer. Defined contribution plans become
fully vested immediately so that employees may keep the full
amount of an employer's contribution. As such, employees are
not penalized by job hopping because their pension benefit
upon retirement is not tied to years of service for a single
employer, pursuant to the defined benefit plan.
The favorable attributes of defined contribution plans have
not gone unnoticed in the public or private sector. Currently,
contribution plans are the retirement vehicle of choice in corporate America." 5 Legislative changes have also eased company
transitions from defined benefit to either defined contribution
plans or hybrid plans11 6 that limit employer responsibility and
Aug. 29, 2006, at A2 (discussing DuPont's decision to move from a defined
benefit plan to a defined contribution plan for the "principal reason" of being
"competitive in the workplace" and being able to "attract and retain
employees").
114. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. tit. 8 (2006)
(previously the Pension Security and Transparency Act of 2005, S. 1783, H.R.
2830, 109th Cong. (2005)); see alsoJeanne Sahadi, New PensionLaw Affects PublicSector, Non-Profit Workers, Too CNNMONEY.cOM, Aug. 22, 2006, http://money.
cnn.com/2006/08/21/pf/retirement/public sectorworkersnewlaweffects/
index.htm (discussing how the new pension law made permanent the increased
contribution levels for 403(b) and 457 accounts).
115. MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 8, at 3. These authors note that
58% of households rely exclusively on defined contribution plans, 19% rely
exclusively on defined benefit plans, and 23% participate in both types of retirement plans. Id. at 1-2 n.1. For a history of private pension funds, see ROBERT
L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (2003) (discussing early company pensions
provided by General Electric and American Express) and James A. Wooten,
"The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The Studebaker-PackardCorporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 683, 686 (2001) (noting that comprehensive pension coverage in the private sector did not begin until the end of
World War II when approximately 20% of corporate employees participated in
a pension plan).
116. Private employers find defined benefit hybrid plans attractive in part
due to the tax penalty potentially incurred should they convert to a defined
contribution plan. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4980 (2000) (requiring an employer
to pay income tax on overfunded plans and a 50% tax penalty). Hybrid plans
include pension equity plans, life cycle pension plans, and the popular cash
balance plan. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 345-53. Cash balance plans
create hypothetical accounts for employees based on their contributions at a
specified rate of interest. Id. at 345-46. If the account earns more interest on
the funds, the employer keeps the excess. If the account earns less interest, the
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117
liability for retirement benefits.
These changes are necessary due to the dramatic increase in
underfunded company-sponsored defined benefit plans." 8
Moreover, while the retirement benefits of private workers are
partially covered by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC)" 9 in the event their company terminates the defined
benefit plan and is unable to make up the deficiency, 2 ' the
PBGC, too, is experiencing heavy unfunded liabilities.12 1 Again,

employee is still guaranteed the specified interest rate. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a) (4)-8(c) (3) (i) (2001). For further discussion of cash balance plans,
see Zelinsky, supra note 17, at 683; see also Daniel J. Sennott, Note, Finding the
Balance in Cash Balance Pension Plans, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1059 (2001).
117. In 2005, Congress introduced a number of bills to address private
pension funding issues. See, e.g., National Employee Savings and Trust Equity
Guarantee Act of 2005, S. 219, 109th Cong. (2005) (introducedJune 23, 2005).
The recently enacted legislation includes the elimination of age discrimination
claims due to company conversion from defined benefit plans to the hybrid
cash balance plans. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 114, at tit. 7;
see also U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMIT=EE, LEGISLATIVE NOTICE: H.R. 4
- PENSION PROTECrION AcT OF 2006 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://rpc.senate.gov/

_files/L53HR4Pensions080206DK.pdf [hereinafter LEGIslATIVE NOTICE] (discussing history of the legislation). Cash balance conversions have been controversial in the courts. See Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th
Cir. 2006) (finding IBM's cash balance conversion was not unlawfully
discriminatory).
118. Preventingthe Next Pension Collapse: Lessons from the United Airlines Case:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Bradley
D. Belt, Exec. Dir., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.), available at http://www.
senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/bbtestO6O705.pdf (discussing rise in pension underfunding filings from 2000 to 2004). In 2000, 221 plans
were underfunded by $19.91 billion. Id. In 2004, the number of underfunded
plans had increased to 1,108, with $353.73 billion in underfunding. Id.
119. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation [hereinafter PBGC] is
a federal corporation established by ERISA in 1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309
(2000) (establishing PBGC). See The Pension Underfunding Crisis: How Effective
Have Reforms Been?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce,
108th Cong. 50 (2003) [hereinafter Iwry, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce] (statement of J. Mark Iwry, Esq., Non-Resident Senior
Fellow, The Brookings Institute), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_househeaings&docid=f:90145.pdf. The
PBGC is intended to protect retirement benefits of participants in qualified
defined benefit plans. Id. The PBGC covers more than 32,000 defined benefit
plans and 44 million workers. Id. The PBGC is funded in part by insurance
premiums paid by employers. Id.
120. PBGC pays a monthly amount up to a statutorily defined pension
benefit "just under $44,000 for pensions beginning at age 65 and significantly
less for pensions beginning earlier." Iwry, HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, supranote 119, at 50. PBGC may also obtain a court order
to terminate a plan the employer has not voluntarily terminated. Id.
121. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 24 n.1
(2005), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2004-annualreport.pdf. The
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poor market performance, as well as the weakness and resulting
as steel and air
termination of retirement plans in such 1industries
22
transportation, accounts for the deficit.
As early as 1986, the federal government also saw the wisdom of sponsoring an alternative contribution-type plan to pub23
lic employees and made changes to its retirement system.
With more than half of federal workers currently enrolled in the
contribution plan, the federal retirement system is foreclosed
from the unfunded pension liabilities facing state and local
governments. 124
Several states are following the trend away from defined benplans
and attempting retirement reform via defined contriefit
bution plans.' 25 In 2002, for the first time, Florida offered
defined contribution plans as an option to its employees.' 26 New
PBGC estimates that the total underfunding in all plans exceeded $600 billion
as of 2004. See id. The Government Accountability Office has once again
placed the PBGC's single employer insurance program on its list of 'high risk'
government programs. PBGC Reform: Mending the Pension Safety Net: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Retirement Security and Aging of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Bradley D. Belt,
Exec. Dir., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.), available at http://dol.gov/ebsa/
pdf/ty042605.pdf.
122. See Private Pensions: Airline Plans' Underfunding Illustrates Broader
Problems with the Defined Benefit Pension System: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of David M.
Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the United States), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d05108t.pdf; see also LEGISLATIVE NOTICE, supra note 117, at 10
(explaining special relief for airlines in the Pension Protection Act of 2006).
For further discussion of private pension liability and proposals for reform, see
T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: Private
Pension Liability and Proposalsfor Reform, 9 U. PA.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495 (2007).
123. See Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99335, 100 Stat. 514 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8431-8840 (2000)). For
a comparison between the new and old federal systems, see Edwin C. Hustead &
Toni Hustead, Federal Civilian and Military Retirement Systems, in PENSIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 14, at 66, 68-69 and Melynda Dovel Wilcox, A NittyGritty Guide to Retirement for Feds, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. 1995, at 75.
For a history of federal employee pensions, see CLARK, CRAIG & WILSON, supra
note 115, at 5 (explaining the Federal Employees Retirement Act in 1920 covering civil service workers).
124. Hustead & Hustead, supra note 123, at 66-70. The Board of Actuaries for the federal retirement system estimates that by 2015, over 95% of federal employees will be covered under the 1986 plan. Id.
125. In states that continue to offer the conventional defined benefit
plan, many are offering a supplemental defined contribution plan. See I.R.C.
§ 457 (2002); see also Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 505 (discussing government use
of I.R.C. § 457 plans).
126. FLA. RETIREMENT SYSTEM, SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION: FRS INVESTMENT PLAN 6 (2005). The new contribution plan requires a 9% employer contribution and no employee contributions. Id. The defined contribution plan
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hires are automatically enrolled in the defined benefit plan but
may, within five months following the date of hire, elect to participate in the defined contribution plan. 12 7 Existing public
employees are also allowed to convert from the defined benefit
plan to the defined contribution plan. 2 8
The Colorado General Assembly recently created a defined
contribution plan as an alternative to its defined benefit plan.
Beginning January 1, 2006, state employees in Colorado have the
option of choosing between the defined benefit or contribution
plan for their retirement savings.12 9 Defined contribution plans
will be offered to higher education employees hired in 2008.130
Likewise, Hawaii created a defined contribution plan for new
public employees. In contrast to Colorado, however, Hawaii's
defined contribution plan
serves as the exclusive retirement
13 1
account for new hires.
In Illinois, conversion from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution system appears imminent. The Pension Commission recommended replacing all or part of the state's defined
benefit plans with defined contribution plans.' 3 2 Recall that Illinois is experiencing the worst unfunded pension liabilities of any
state in the nation.1 33 The Commission concluded that a defined
contribution plan would "significantly reduce unfunded liabilities."' 3 4 Therefore, it urged that this alternative form of retirement plan be "strongly considered," in the near term, for both
135
new hires and current employees.
has more favorable vesting rules than the defined benefit plan. Vesting under
the former plan occurs after one year of service while the latter plan requires
six years of service. Id.
127. Id. Perhaps due to the lack of education concerning the contribution plan, but see Press Release, Florida State Board of Administration, Update
on Choice in the Florida Retirement System (Dec. 31, 2006), availableat http://
www.sbafla.com/pdf%5Cnews%5CUpdate%20on%2OChoice.pdf
(discussing
financial guidance program and ongoing efforts to help employees make
informed retirement plan choices), less than 5% of participants chose to transfer to the defined contribution plan. Id. at 3.
128. Id. Between September 2002 and June 2003, eight percent of new
participants chose the defined contribution plan. See id. at 4. Twenty percent
actively elected the same plan from July through December 2006. Id. at 3-4.

129. COLO. REv.

STAT. ANN

§ 24-51-1502 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); see

also H.R. 1231, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2005).
130. Bartels, supra note 107, at 4A.
131. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 88-1 to -344 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp.
2005).
132. GOVERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 15.
133. See discussion supra Part II.C.
134. GOVERNOR'S PENSION COMMISSION, supra note 80, at 15.
135. Id.
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Although not yet facing the financial woes of Illinois, 1 6 California's proposed solution is to no longer offer defined benefit
plans. Instead, the state government would offer all new hires
defined contribution plans. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
spearheaded the plan to privatize California's pension fund to
help reduce the state's $9.1 billion budget deficit."3 7 The governor cited "huge costs and the open-ended liabilities" for the taxpayers for keeping the defined benefit plan in the future.138 The
proposed change, however, required a constitutional amendment that was opposed by the CalPERS Board of Administration.139 Given the opposition, Schwarzenegger later abandoned
his proposal to change to a defined contribution plan. Thus,
California continues to operate under the defined benefit retirement system. Even the Golden State, however, is not immune to
declining investment returns and rising pension costs and benefits due to demographics that demonstrate that it, too, will tackle
pension reform in the near future. Consequently, California and
other states should strongly consider offering the defined contribution plan to state employees as one measure to reduce the fiscal stress on their retirement systems.
B.

Mandatory Uniform Disclosure

In addition to sponsoring an optional or exclusive defined
contribution retirement plan for public employees, states should
enact uniform laws mandating periodic disclosure by those managing the public pension systems. Financial transparency is key.
Without it, those with an interest in monitoring the system are
unable to do so. The absence of public awareness today is arguably one of the reasons for the state of emergency of most public
pensions. Only mandatory, meaningful review of state and local
136. See discussion supra Part II.D.
137. Kate Berry, SchwarzeneggerEmbraces Idea of PrivateRetirement Accounts,
L.A. Bus. J., Feb. 21, 2005, at 38.
138. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., Governor Promotes Pension Reform Proposal in San Diego (Feb. 10, 2005), http://gov.ca.gov/index.
php?/prin t-version/speech/2280.
139. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., CalPERS Board Votes
to Oppose Defined Contribution Legislation (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http:/

/www.calpers.ca.gov/index/jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2005/feb/oppose-dc-contribution.xml. The Board later issued its own proposed reforms designed to
keep the defined benefit system. See Press Release, Rob Feckner, President, Bd.
of Adm', Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., Statement on Governor Schwarzenegger Withdrawal of Pension Overhaul Initiative (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http:/

/www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2005/april/gov-withdrwlpension.xml.
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pensions can timely identify underfunding issues and facilitate
solutions. 140
The uniformity of the disclosure laws across the country also
aids understanding and enables governments to better solve
their pension problems. As discussed in Part II, pension funds
vary widely, with different sets of laws for each system. The laws
differ with respect to vesting requirements, fiduciary standards,
and reporting rules. 14 ' Adopting the same criteria for reporting
within and between states allows a comprehensive comparison of
each separate system. It may also serve as a check on government
action that may weaken pension systems, such as when states bor14 2
row from public pension funds or reduce contribution rates.
Even before the current crisis in public pension systems, the
goal of transparency-to permit public monitoring-led the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
140. Due to the failing financial health of pensions in the private sector,
proposed regulatory initiatives and the newly enacted legislation also contain
additional disclosure rules. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 114,
at tit. 5; see also H. COMM. ON EDUCATION & THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL
SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 2830): STRENGTHENING RETIREMENT SECURITY, PROTECTING TAXPAYERS BY FIXING OUTDATED WORKER PENSION

LAWS (Mar. 8, 2006); But see Hess, supra note 19, at 218 (noting empirical evidence to suggest that at least some automatic disclosure to members may have
negative implications on fund financial performance); see also Ricardo Bayon,
Show Us The Money: Lawsuits are Prying Open the Hidden Investments of Public Pensions, But Disclosure Comes at a Price, LEGAL Arr., May-June 2005, 23 (discussing
benefits and pitfalls of several lawsuits in California, Texas, and Michigan that
are aimed at state university pension funds and prompting disclosure of their
financial performance).
141. See generally CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PUBLIC PENSION PLANS: THE STATE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2d ed. 1993) (discussing various disclosure and
reporting requirements in states). In a survey of state and local government
pension funds by the Government Finance Officers Association and the Public
Pension Coordinating Council, 90% had an annual report, but half of those
systems distributed it only on demand. Hess, supra note 19, at 191, 210.
142. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, PensionFunding in the Public
Sector, 76 REv. ECON. & STAT. 278, 278 (1994) (discussing state government borrowing from public pension funds); Peng, supra note 19, at 68-69 (explaining
how New York City used a pension fund surplus in the late 1990s to reduce its
contribution to the fund that then became underfunded); John M. Broder,
Sunny San Diego Finds Itself Being Viewed as a Kind of Enron-by-the-Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2004, at A14 (creating a $1.15 billion pension deficit due to the diversion of plan assets in San Diego). The extent to which state governments use
their pension funds for other budgetary matters is controversial. Compare Hess,
supra note 19, at 204 (reviewing studies that "consistently show that state and
local governments use their pension funds as safety valves") with Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sund~n, Investment Practicesof State and Local PensionFunds: Implicationsfor Social Security Reform, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 14,
at 153, 174 (concluding that it is a rare occurrence and usually corrected).
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to approve the Uniform Management of Public Employees
Retirement Systems Act (UMPERS) in 1997.143 UMPERS establishes the standards of fiduciary conduct and the disclosure
duties of public pension funds.1 44
The reporting obligation requires three types of reports to
be produced and distributed by each retirement system: a summary plan description, an annual disclosure of financial and
actuarial status, and an annual report. 45 The summary plan
description provides an explanation of the retirement program
and its benefits. 4 6 It must be distributed to plan participants
and beneficiaries and made available to the public.14 7 The
annual disclosure of financial and actuarial status is a more
detailed compilation of the retirement system and its financial
position.1 48 Due to the costs involved in gathering such information, the disclosure need not be published. 149 It must, however,
be available at the principal office of the system and at a central
repository where reports of all systems in a state are filed. 15' The
annual report must contain specific financial and actuarial information. 151 It has the same 1wide
distribution requirements as the
5 2
summary plan description.

Despite the importance and logic of the foregoing disclosure requirements, UMPERS has not been popular. To date,
only Wyoming 153 and Maryland 154 have adopted the contents of
143. Unif. Mgmt. of Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. Act, 7A U.L.A. 336 (1998),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#mpersa (last visited
June 20, 2006). For a summary of the Act by one of its reporters, see generally
Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee
Retirement Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 141 (1998).
144. See Willborn, supra note 143, at 141.
145. Sections thirteen through eighteen address the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act. Unif. Mgmt. of Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. Act,
§§ 13-18, 7A pt.3 U.L.A. 75-85 (2006).
146. See id. § 16.
147. See id. § 13(b)(2) -(3); see also id. § 14(a)(1)-(3).
148. See id. § 17.
149. See id. §§ 13(b), 14.
150. See id. § 18.
151. See id.

152. See id. §§ 13(b) (5), 14(a) (4).
153. Eight years after its approval by the Uniform Law Commission, Wyoming became the first state to adopt the Uniform Management of Public
Employees Retirement Systems Act on February 25, 2005. Press Release, Nat'l

Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Unif. Law Comm'rs, Wyoming
Enacts Important State Law on Managing Public Employee Retirement Systems
(Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/
NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=134. The law became effective July 1, 2006. Id.
154. Interestingly, Maryland's pension fund management had been subject to public scrutiny. See, e.g., Stephanie Hanes, Chapman Draws 712-YearPrison
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the uniform law.' 5 5 UMPERS should be adopted, or at minimum, state and local governments should enact their own financial disclosure reforms to protect the retirement savings of their
public employees. These disclosures should include periodic
statements of account balances, other important information
specific to the employee's retirement plan, and the availability, if
any, of alternative plans.15 6
Obviously, both of the foregoing reforms are long-term solutions to the problem of public pension underfunding. In the
short-run, state governments must contribute more money to
their pension funds to accommodate participants still within
their defined benefit systems. 57
CONCLUSION

Compared to pensions in corporate America, there has been
relatively little research on the financial status of government
pensions.'-" Yet the 2005 Wilshire Report shows that public
plans are confronting even
more serious and pressing retirement
1 9
issues than private plans.
Term, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 2, 2004, at IA; Michael Dresser & Jon Morgan, Md.
Pension Trustees Are Often Absent, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 18, 2001, at IB; Jon Morgan et al., Questions Abound in Pension's Fiscal Skid, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 15,

2001, at IA.
155. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts
About The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (1997),
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-umper
sa.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
156. See Andrea L. Kusko, James M. Poterba & David W. Wilcox, Employee
Decisions with Respect to 401(k) Plans, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra note 109, at 98, 109 (Olivia S. Mitchell & SylvesterJ. Schieber eds.,
1998).
157. In addition to bond financing, see discussion supra notes 100-05 and
accompanying text, options include raising taxes as well as reducing benefits
and/or delaying their commencement. Cf Anenson & Lahey, supranote 122, at
527-28 (proposing lowering private pension insurance benefits to maintain the
financial integrity of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation). Similar suggestions have been made to cure the financial insecurity of the Social Security
system. See HenryJ. Aaron, Social Security: Tune It Up, Don't Trade It In, in HENRY
J. AARON & JOHN B. SHOVEN, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PRIVATIZE SOCIAL
SECURTY? 55, 89-94 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1999); PETER A. DIAMOND &
PETER

R.

ORSZAG,

SAVING

SOCIAL SECURITY:

A BALANCED

APPROACH

23, 83,

87-88, 93, 167-70, 183 (2004).
158. D'Arcy et al., supra note 12, at 347 (comparing the volume of
research done on private pension funding with the lack of research on state
pension funding).
159.

2005 WILSHIRE

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 1.
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It is significant that nine of the ten largest pension funds in
the United States are public pensions.16 These funds hold more
than $2 trillion in assets and affect the lives of over seventeen
million Americans.1 6 1 Public pensions also have a long tradition
in this country. They were offered for the first time to veterans
of the Revolutionary War and have since become part of our
national history. 16 2 In exchange for better retirement earnings,
workers employed in the public sector often accept lower pay to
do the same job as in the private sector.16 To date, historical
evidence supports the idea that their expectations have not been
unreasonable.1 64 But the retirement savings of public workers
are no longer secure. The Wilshire study data now available discloses that state government employees are at risk regarding
their retirement plan benefits.
This article suggests that sponsoring defined contribution
plans will help close the divide between decreasing assets and
increasing liabilities to restore the long-term financial health of
public pensions. It also supports the enactment of state uniform
disclosure laws so that pension funds will be subject to an ongoing meaningful review.
Various statistics were analyzed to identify the problem.
Legal reforms were proposed as part of the solution. Of course,
to what extent these reforms will be adopted rests, not in the
realm of law, but in politics. Like the same transformation occurring in the private sector, a shift from the defined benefit modality to a defined contribution one will revolutionize the way state
160. John H. Ilkiw, Investment Policies, Processes and Problems in U.S. Public
Pension Plans: Some Observations and Solutions from a Practitioner,in PUBLIC PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT: GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INVESTMENT POLIciEs 214 (Alberto R. Musalem & RobertJ. Palacios eds., 2004).
161. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 16-17. Over three million
state and local employees receive retirement benefits and another fourteen million employees participate in these systems. Id. at 17.
162. CLARK, CRAIG & WILSON, supra note 115, at 1-4 (2003); John P.
Resch, Federal Welfare for Revolutionary War Veterans, 56 Soc. SERV. REV. 171, 172
(1982); see also Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on
Retirement, 12 ELDER L.J. 245, 314 (2004) (discussing the advent of social security and its purpose to provide retirement benefits to prevent poverty); Kathleen
H. Czarney, Note, The Futureof Americans' Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan Asset
Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation'sDeficit, 51 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 153, 158 (2004) (same).
163. SeeJohnson, supra note 106, at 113.
164. Id. The ratio of pension benefits to earnings is twice as high in the
public sector as it is in the private sector. See id. at 114 (noting that pension
wealth is 80% higher for state employees compared to their private employee
counterparts).
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employees experience and contemplate retirement. 165 Therefore, the question of public pension liability will ultimately be
answered as a matter of public policy.

165. See Zelinsky, supra note 9, at 454 ("While the emergence of the
defined contribution society has been a quiet, largely unheralded revolution, a
revolution it has been, incrementally but fundamentally changing the manner
in which Americans think about tax and social policy and in which their governments formulate such policy."); see also id. at 457-58, 469.

